descriptions of these internationalization and privatization processes, the current phase (2007-2010) is dedicated to explaining the observed changes in statehood.
B. The Transformation of the State is the Transformation of Society
At the centre of such a research program we find attempts from various perspectives to design theories of institutional change. In this context, the German Law Journal Conference brought such different approaches into sharper relief, focusing particularly on the role of evolutionary theory to explain the dramatic transformations in political and legal governance. The papers in this Symposium issue bring together a variety of different theoretical perspectives mainly from law, economics, sociology and legal theory. The 2007 Conference was the 5th time that the Editors of the German Law Journal invited scholars from around the world to address crucial themes in contemporary socio-legal debate. 3 The particular challenge of last year's conference had been materializing through an everheightening, transnational discussion concerning the emerging trajectories in governance transformation. The authors of our Symposium explore the consequences and challenges arising from the sociological account of state transformation so powerfully captured by Saskia Sassen as an erosion of state sovereignty both from 'below', brought about by processes of privatization and emerging forms of public-private governance on the one hand, and from 'above', through processes of transnationalization of collaborative, regulatory governance, on the other. 4 , but today a more appropriate formulation would be the recognition that, in fact, 'We are all economists' now. The underlying conundrum is that of the trajectories of institutional change. According to the representatives of the New Institutional Economics, which are frequently referenced and discussed in the following Symposium contributions, governance structures are best described as institutions, which themselves comprise "both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)."
6 Changes in institutional design occur "incrementally, connecting the past with the present with the future; history in consequence is largely a story of institutional evolution in which the historical performance of economies can only be understood as part of a sequential story." 7 This however persuasive narrative suggests -for the lawyer -a dramatic relativization of law and the state within this tableau of historical evolution of societal governance. But, as the debate unfoldsboth within 8 and outside 9 of the economists' camp -, more questions arise as to the appropriateness of the applied perspectives, tools and instruments. As is evidenced by the contributions to this issue, the tension between law and economics or, between law and non-law, as it has for a long time been apprehended in different domestic regulatory areas 10 , becomes only more exacerbated in the transnational arena where reference points to established institutions and processes of conflict resolution are largely absent. As the utopia of transnational governance continues to unfold, either as the Wild West of unrestrained individual liberty, the struggle over recognition, civil society 1 ' and solidarity 12 or fragmented world society 3 , the 'law has lost its lieu' 14 -or, has it? Is the 'Global Bukowina' 15 a realm of law, of social norms or of economic liberties? What are we to make of these distinctions, after all? To sustain them as paradoxes means to recognize that they are always part of the same problem and cannot properly be disentangled without unduly prioritizing one over the other. 16 Yet, this process does not continue in a quiet state of contentment and wonder, but rather in surprise, happenstance and terror. While it is true, that "[tioday's problems are determined by the fact that the fundamental structural change of functional differentiation has destroyed the Old European semantics without residue, and that even the most hectic post-modern polystnmies can be understood only as a restless search for socially adequate self-descriptions", catastrophes and the change in social structures lead to a ruining of semantics. 17 Communication, then, the semantics of the particular observing systems such as law, politics, economics and others, is respectively thrown back onto itself. The legal system must -and will -process the change in its environment by relying on its very own available operations. The same holds true for other social systems as well, but that only further dramatizes the impression of a world falling apart, of reference systems eroding.
C. Norms and the Law: Opposition or Complementarity?
It is in this disturbing landscape of frustrated illusions of welfare state utopias 1 8 and devastated hopes for governance design as evidenced by the now unfolding calamity of the financial markets that institutional economics and, as a variation thereof, 'social norms theory '19 offer themselves as more appropriate forms of regulation, close to the ground, problem-oriented and interest-driven, undeterred by interventions from ideological policy makers or incompetent judges. This attitude has prominently been pronounced in contract law: Parties are here described as generally wanting to abstain from (over-) burdening courts, which they anyway hold to be incompetent. 20 Furthermore, social norms theorists point to the parties' willingness to engage with the other in a way that is efficient for both sides, involving "reputation, ethnic and family connections and other elements of non-legal regulation" 21 , because "[t]he Chance of winning a contract suit is pretty much random."
22
This sometimes overly polemic turn to 'norms' and the arguments in its support suggest an ambiguous move away from 'law', which has significant consequences for an assessment of the connections and complementarities between law and norms. Attacks on 'welfarist' legislation or adjudication, for example in the area of consumer protection, do in fact little service for a much-needed understanding of the political economy embedded in which the correlation between law/norms and law/non-law has always been and will be evolving. It is here where legal and sociological scholarship is already making very fruitful advances in translating state-oriented assessments developed within the nation-state into much more sophisticated conceptualizations of institutionalized governance in a global knowledge society.
23
Following Paul Pierson's suggestion to explore institutional trajectories with an emphasis on the forces driving or halting, but in any way shaping their development 24 , the question arises how to account for the messy regulatory mixture of the early 19th century interventionist and the mid-20t1 century welfare state out of which the currently dominant position seems to have emerged, which argues for radical constraints on regulatory adjudication or legislation. A number of emerging analytical discourses are at present competing to render an adequate description of this complex environment: legal pluralism, appearing in various shades and 20 E. POSNER, supra note 10, at 152: "Courts have trouble understanding the simplest of business relationships." the dominant and, thus, dominating, hegemonic and imperialist rationality among the social systems and, secondly, that the regulatory challenges, which present themselves at the beginning of the 21st century as a result of the nation-state's regulatory transformation towards an 'enabling' state 33 on the one hand and of the transnational arena's unrulyness on the other, are likely to outrun conceptual approaches 34 as well as normative ones that aim at the reconstruction of the nationstate's once determinative categories of 'government' and 'legitimacy'.
35

D. Law & Evolution
Against this background the contributors to the conference reflect on evolutionary approaches to explaining institutional change from different perspectives. Martina Eckardt introduces an 'evolutionary economics'-perspective to explain legal change. She starts examining statutory and judge-made legal change as mechanisms that are inherent to the law in order to broaden the perspective to the co-evolution of law and technology. Wolfgang Kerber in his contribution on institutional change in globalization examines transnational commercial law from an evolutionary economics perspective. He starts with the recent discussion of inter-jurisdictional or regulatory competition in the context of globalization. While such competition is usually conceptualized as taking placing between different states, Kerber suggests to include as well private solutions for the governance of contracts in order to explain their evolution in relation to public solutions. He stresses the importance of meta-rules such as choice-of-law in determining the evolutionary path of private and public solutions between competition and cooperation. Marc Amstutz in his contribution on 'Global (Non-)Law' unfolds a perspective of evolutionary jurisprudence. Reflecting on Hayek he argues that rational choice institutionalism is inadequate for explaining the genesis and evolution of legal norms, since it is not able to distinguish between legal and non-legal norms. Because methodological individualism misses the collective logic behind the genesis and evolution of systems of legal norms, he explores the analytical usefulness of systems theory and modern evolution theory as a means of resolving the issue. He suggests 'rules on rules' and 'textuality' as two reflexive criteria. Bart Du Laing in turn suggests that in explaining institutional change we should draw more attention to the original source, i.e. to biological evolutionary theory. The behavioural approach of 'dual inheritance theory', he argues, might prevent legal theory -especially that informed by systems theory -from losing sight of what is happening at lower levels of organization like the behavioral one, including human socio-cultural behavior.
While this more theoretical debate implies that 'evolutionary economics' and 'systems theory' are two incommensurate approaches, Gralf-Peter Calliess, Jrg Freiling, and Moritz Renner try to show in their contribution, how these different perspectives might complement each other in an intersdisciplinary endeavour to explaining institutional change in the governance of cross-border commercial transactions. Similarly Jan Smits in his paper explores the feasibility of applying evolutionary concepts to the explanation of change in transnational and European private law. He concludes that the concepts of path dependency, adaptation, and co-existence (diversity) are particularly helpful. Mauro Zamboni, however, remains quite sceptical towards evolutionary explanations of legal change. He argues that the main obstacle to acceptance of evolutionary theory in legal discourse is its obvious lack of an explicit normative side, where lawyers, law-makers and judges can retrieve "ought" criteria to be used for deciding in which directions future lawmaking should proceed. He suggests that the evolutionary approach can reach a higher degree of accuracy in its predictions by becoming a 'legal evolutionary theory', that is by offering also normative criteria law-makers may use in taking future decisions.
As diverse as the presentations and the discussions at the conference may have been, the value of this conference volume lies not only in giving an up-to-date overview over different evolutionary approaches to institutional and legal change. The distinctive feature of this volume is that all authors agreed to apply their theoretical approaches to the same issue area, and that is to the governance of international commercial transactions. Thus, we believe that the volume does not only make the different approaches comparable in revealing their specific advantages and disadvantages when applied to institutional change, but the volume also contributes to the broader discussion on the issue of trans-border commerce and its institutional organization.
